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Microcredit and the
Rural Poor
A Review of the
Maharashtra Rural
Credit Project
by Raghav Gaiha
Abstract: An attempt is made to review the Maharashtra Rural Credit
Project (MRCP)—a microcredit scheme—by focusing on the process of
implementation and its implications for targeting, empowerment of
women, and trade-off between coverage of the poorest and sustainability of this scheme. Attention is drawn to deficiencies in the design
and implementation of this scheme that limit the participation of the
poorest and the benefits accruing to them. Moreover, it is argued that
there is a risk of overstating the trade-off between the coverage of the
poorest and sustainability of the MRCP if these deficiencies are overlooked.

Introduction
The Maharashtra Rural Credit Project (MRCP), funded by
International Fund for Agricultural Development (IFAD),
among others, was launched in 1994. Since its inception, it has
made substantial progress (UNOPS, 1997, 1998; IFAD, 1997,
1999). The present study is a selective review of the process of
implementation of this project, focusing on the targeting of
the poorest, women’s control over the assets acquired, and
trade-offs between coverage of the poorest and sustainability
of this project. Although aspects of the impact of the MRCP
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are considered, these are not central to the analysis. The analysis is based on interviews of agencies involved in its implementation and a small sample of households in three villages in
Pune District (Maharashtra). Although it is risky to generalize
from a small survey—especially in view of the variation in the
performance of the MRCP in different districts—some useful
insights into its functioning are obtained.
According to a recent estimate, barely 20% of the rural
poor and 10% of the poor women had access to institutional
credit ( IFAD, 1999). Unavoidably, they continue to depend
largely on the informal sector (e.g., money lenders, traders,
friends, and relatives). Apart from high interest rates—ranging
from 5–10% per month—usually informal credit sources do not
cater to productive needs. There is thus a large unmet demand
for credit among the rural poor. Also, there is demand for savings and insurance services. Savings are valued as they enhance
family security—provide insurance during periods of stress, a
source of consumption smoothing, and margin money for asset
purchase loans. Various forms of insurance—life insurance,
health insurance, and crop insurance—are desired for providing
protection against contingencies (e.g., accidents, illness,
drought).

The MRCP
Rationale
It was against this background of a large unmet demand for
microfinance services that the MRCP was designed. More
specifically, the purpose was to “develop and test through field
implementation, an alternative approach to the Integrated
Rural Development Program (IRDP) that could efficiently provide improved financial services to the rural poor.” If successful, the approach could be “incorporated into the large IRDP
program, thereby not only improving its efficiency but also its
Raghav Gaiha is Professor of Public Policy, Faculty of Management Studies, at
University of Delhi, India.
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targeting of the deserving poor” (IFAD, 1997, p. 2). 1 The wideranging financial and economic reforms initiated in mid-1991
reinforced this concern. An apprehension was that the emphasis on efficiency and profitability could force closing down
unprofitable bank branches, thereby further reducing the
access of the rural poor. The MRCP aims to demonstrate that
a sustainable improvement in the delivery of financial services
to the rural poor is feasible.

Objectives
Broadly, the MRCP was designed to (1) improve access of the
rural poor to financial services, (2) to make them bankable
clients, and (3) promote savings mobilization among them
through self-help groups (SHGs).
Scale
The project with an outlay of US$48.35 million is supported
by an IFAD loan of US$29.20 million. The contribution of the
government of India (GOI) and the government of
Maharashtra (GOM) is US$14.97 million and of the participating banks is US$1.65 million. The projected co-finance of
US$2.5 million has not yet materialized. The loan agreement
was approved on 1 June 1993 and became effective on 6
January 1994 (UNOPS, 1998).
In the initial phase, the project covered four districts
(Pune, Chandrapur, Yavatmal, and Nanded). Following the
Mid-Term Review and Evaluation in October 1997, seven
more districts were added (Thane, Dhule, Jalgaon, Amravati,
Bhandara, Gadchirali, and Beed). With the proposed expansion
(in phase II), the project benefits are expected to cover 91,250
borrowers including 54,300 members of SHGs (UNOPS,
1998).
Salient Features
The target group consists of households below the poverty line
(i.e., with annual household income up to Rs.11000 at 1991-92
prices). 2 Priority is given to those with incomes up to Rs.8,500.
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This subset comprises mostly small/marginal farmers, landless,
artisans, and tribals.
In order to make the MRCP truly participatory, a village
development assembly (VDA) comprising all households in a
village is formed. This serves as a forum for a preliminary dialogue on the problems, prospects, and process of development.
Out of the VDA, a village development council (VDC)—comprising 10–12 members—is constituted. The VDA prepares a
people’s action plan (PAP), focusing broadly on social development of the village—especially credit requirements and support systems. The VDC is responsible for its implementation.
Two channels of credit are used: individuals and SHGs.
Using the list of poor households, eligible (individual) beneficiaries are identified in a meeting of the VDC, attended by the
members of the council and representatives of the NGO, the
CB (commercial or participating banks) and other implementing agencies. SHGs, on the other hand, are formed either by
Mahila Arthik Vikas Mahamandal (MAVIM) directly through
its sahyoginis (SYGs)/field workers or through NGOs contracted by it or by the banks directly or through NGOs contracted by them. Both individual and group borrowers are
charged an interest rate of 12% per annum. Individual borrowers are given loans for specific activities. SHGs, on the other
hand, are required to mobilize savings first. After achieving
some financial discipline, SHGs are allowed to borrow against
their savings deposits from a CB. The loans are distributed
among the members in accordance with their own
priorities/rules (about loan use, amount, interest rate, repayment, and penalty). The rate of interest is typically 2–3% per
month. Consumption loans are permitted. Eventually, when
the credit worthiness of SHGs is established, it is expected that
they will be able to borrow independently from CBs.
Coordination committees were set up at the national, state,
and district levels. A task force coordinates at the block level.
VDAs/VDCs, assisted by village level workers, do so at the village level.
128
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Considerable importance is attached to information about
investment opportunities, skill formation, and technical advice.
Several agencies (MAVIM, Maharashtra Industrial and
Technical Consultancy Organization [MITCON] and
Maharashtra Centre for Entrepreneurship Development
[MCED]) provide these services to the borrowers. Moreover,
members of VDCs are trained to perform their functions efficiently, as also are the sahyoginis. Bank staff, on the other
hand, are trained to deal more sympathetically with poor borrowers with limited financial skills and training. Some major
deficiencies of the IRDP are avoided, as the poor borrowers are
better equipped to use the loans productively and the implementing agencies (e.g., CBs) are more sensitive to their special
needs. Under the MRCP, while CBs lend at 12% per annum, the
average cost of funds for them is 9–10%. As this spread does not
cover their costs, NABARD provides full refinance at 6%.

Issues
Earlier review points to the rapid expansion of the MRCP.
However, attention is also drawn to a few weaknesses. Firstly,
there is some concern that the targeting has been unsatisfactory. As of March 1997, out of the 11,000 members of SHGs,
about 32% were nonpoor, or not below the poverty line (nonBPL). Out of the four districts in phase 1, Yavatmal had the
best record in this respect, with about 82% of the members
classified as BPL. Given the data constraints and credit delivery
system, it is suggested that a share of about one third of nonpoor beneficiaries is about right (UNOPS, 1998). But this view
is contestable on several grounds. One difficulty is of course
the unreliability of the list of BPL households. Often it
includes 80–90% of all households in a village. But more seriously, excessive coverage of non-BPL households in some areas
is largely a consequence of inactive VDCs or their manipulation by locally influential persons. Secondly, although SHGs
have been instrumental in channeling credit to poor rural
women and in imparting self-confidence to them, there is some
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concern that linkage to the banks has been slow. 3 The reasons
include cumbersome procedures (e.g., elaborate documentation), relative unimportance of MRCP loans in the banks’
portfolios, and lack of incentives to field officers (FOs).
Finally, despite the emphasis on market intelligence, skill formation and technical assistance, the promotion of off-farm
activities has been unimpressive. Evidently, the information
and training provided warrant some reorientation. For example, it is not obvious how useful Entrepreneurship
Development Programs (EPDs) are for poor rural women
without any exposure to markets.
Given this overview, a selective review of the MRCP was
undertaken for a deeper understanding of its functioning. The
review focuses on the following issues.
1. One is whether there is scope for better targeting on the
poor. In particular, an issue is whether the exclusion of the
poorest is deliberate (i.e., due to the bias of the implementing agencies, e.g., banks).
2. Another major concern is whether women have any control
over assets and incomes accruing from them, as it has important implications for household welfare. 4 In male dominated
communities, there is a danger that women may be used as
conduits for obtaining loans. In fact, there is some evidence
that repayment difficulties resulted in violence against
women in Bangladesh (Rahman, 1998). An issue is whether
there are some assets or activities that allow women greater
flexibility in combining them with household chores.
3. Since the MRCP was designed to demonstrate the superiority of an alternative approach to that of the IRDP, an issue is
whether closer involvement of the community in the MRCP
makes a difference.
Given the objective of this study and the sample design,
precise inferences about these aspects cannot be drawn. Rather,
the focus will be on some broad outcomes and the underlying
processes.
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Methodology
Considering that the focus of the present study is on the
process of implementation of the MRCP, it was decided to conduct detailed interviews of representatives of implementing
agencies and a few participating and nonparticipating households (constituting the control group). The interviews were
based on structured questionnaires. Thus a composite account
of the functioning of this project is obtained.

Sample Design
Villages
Pune District was chosen largely because of its diversified rural
economy. Given the time and budget constraints, three villages
(Kanhewadi, Mohkal, and Kaman) were chosen. As described
below, these villages reflect wide variation in socioeconomic
conditions.
Apart from variation in opportunities for gainful employment in agriculture (associated with variation in irrigated area),
the composition of the village population—particularly the
share of the poorest groups—also varies considerably.
Kanhewadi has the highest share of scheduled caste/scheduled
tribe (SC/ST) population (48.60%), followed by Mohkal
(19.60%) and Kaman (15.78%). The occupational distribution
of workers also differs. Considering the shares of cultivators
and agricultural labourers, Kanhewadi’s shares are 61.50% and
26.10%, Mohkal’s 78.06% and 18.50%, and Kaman’s 74.90%
and 13.30%.
Households
Although the sample was purposive, some attention was given
to its representativeness with a view to better understanding
the exclusion of the poorest and inclusion of nontarget groups
and the diversity of experiences of the beneficiaries. This is
done through a random selection of households from broadly
specified groups. Although a small sample of 30 households did
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not allow much flexibility, some broad considerations consistent with the objectives of this study are noted below.

Individual Beneficiaries
Fifteen individual beneficiaries were interviewed. Ten of these
were supposed to be poor. However, using some broad correlates of poverty (i.e., whether the beneficiary belonged to a
SC/ST, agricultural labour, or smallholder household), the
actual count of poor in the sample turned out to be seven, and
of the relatively affluent, eight. 5
Control Group
Seven nonparticipating households were interviewed, belonging to SC/ST, agricultural labour, and smallholder groups.
SHGs
Women belonging to five SHGs with a satisfactory track
record of savings mobilisation and bank loans were interviewed. Out of these, four belonged to SC/ST, agricultural
labour, or smallholder households, while one belonged to a relatively affluent household.
Control Group
The control group comprises SHGs that were not linked to a
bank. Three women representing such SHGs were interviewed.
All three belonged to SC/ST households.
Implementing Agencies
A few individuals representing official agencies
(NABARD, DRDA, DPCC, MAVIM, MCED, and MITCON),
participating banks (State Bank of India [SBI], Bank of
Maharashtra [BOM]), an NGO (Chaitanya), local community
organizations (VDAs/VDCs), and field-workers (Sahyoginis)
were interviewed.
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Targeting of MRCP
Two aspects of targeting are considered below: one is participation of the poor in the MRCP and the other is the benefits
accruing to them.

Individual Beneficiaries
The sample consisted of fifteen individual beneficiaries, four
from Kanhevadi, three from Mohkal, and eight from Kaman.
Although it was intended to have a larger number of poor participants than nonpoor participants, the latter turned out to be
larger. As the number of poor participants is seven, less than
50% are poor. Among the poor, three are extremely poor (i.e.,
their household incomes were Rs. 2500 per annum). There are
two widows: one owns 0.50 acre of land and the other is landless. Among the poor beneficiaries (as also in the complete
sample), the single largest occupational group is agricultural
labourers (i.e., 6).
Even after making an allowance for the difficulties of
excluding non-BPL households altogether, their overrepresentation among the beneficiaries is indisputable. 6 Among them,
one beneficiary owned 20 acres and another 12 acres. As these
beneficiaries would be generally deemed affluent, it is likely
that their inclusion was manipulated.
SHGs (or Group Beneficiaries)
Although the number of SHGs in the sample is small (five), it
is significant that four representatives are poor (all women). 7
Out of the poor, two belong to SC/ST households. Three of
the poor representatives own small quantities of land (ranging
from 0.5 acre to 1.75 acres). The main sources of income are
cultivation and agricultural labour. The only affluent representative (from Mohkal) owns 8 acres of land and belongs to an
upper caste household. Her main source of income is cultivation. Considering the composition of SHGs, it is a fair presumption that the share of poor participants is higher among
the SHGs than among the individual beneficiaries. As the loan
amounts are small and their use is unrestricted (in other words,
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consumption loans are allowed), self-selection of the poor is an
important contributory factor. To the extent that NGOs are
involved in awareness building among the deprived groups, the
self-selection process is strengthened.

Loan Amount
Confining to individual beneficiaries, a notable difference
between the poor and the nonpoor is that the latter secured
much larger loans. Their loans ranged from Rs.10,000 to
Rs.25,000 while those of the poor ranged from Rs.5,000 to
Rs.11,000. Although this is undoubtedly partly a result of the
difference in their absorptive capacities for loans, it cannot be
ruled out that larger loans to the relatively affluent also reflect
their influence with the implementing agencies (VDCs and
banks).
Uses
Although detailed data on loan use could not be obtained,
some differences are indicated. The nonpoor use their loans in
more diverse ways than the poor. Specifically, they use their
loans for buying livestock, digging wells, trading in fruit and
vegetables, and fishing. The poor, on the other hand, use their
loans for buying livestock, goats, and fishing nets. More
importantly, except for two nonpoor beneficiaries, the remaining earned surpluses over and above the loan dues. On the
other hand, while the poor earned enough to repay the dues,
two experienced difficulties—one because of seasonally low
yields (in fishing) and another because of a contingency (illness).
To sum up, among the individual borrowers, the number
of relatively affluent was nonnegligible. More seriously, even
their benefits were substantially larger.

Self-Help Groups (SHGS)
As SHGs are an innovative feature of the MRCP, their functioning and impact are reviewed in detail. The five successful
cases are reviewed first.
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Functioning
As noted earlier, except for one, all representatives belonged to
poor households (including SC/ST households). Given the
group homogeneity, it follows that the share of the poor was
higher among SHGs than among individual beneficiaries. The
self-selection of the poor in SHGs owed much to the efforts of
Grameen Mahila Swayam Sevak Sangh (a women’s group) and
Chaitanya (an NGO). Moreover, as a result of training
received, their awareness of how the scheme operated was
much better.
Usually, a group leader is elected to conduct the meetings
of the SHG. The size of the meeting varies from 15–20 persons.
The meetings are held once a month on a fixed date. The
agenda are announced in advance. Items include minutes of the
previous meeting, disbursement of loans, collection of savings,
fines, and other related matters. Records of loans and savings
are maintained by a member of the SHG or the group leader.
These are verified by a representative of Chaitanya and are
sometimes audited by an external agency. The members are
fully aware of the entry and exit rules. A new member, for
example, has to pay all dues. Members are discouraged to leave
before five years. When a member leaves, all her savings with
interest are returned.
The time taken for borrowing from a bank varies with the
SHG. Usually, the minimum period is 1–3 years. Savings
mobilisation through small weekly or monthly installments is
impressive. The monthly savings of the SHG in Mohkal, for
example, are Rs.2000 and the total (accumulated savings inclusive of interest) Rs.1,10,000. Savings are deposited in a bank (in
a savings account) against which a loan is obtained. Usually,
the ratio of credit to savings is 2:1, although it is allowed to
vary from 1:1 to 4:1 (Karmakar, 1999). The average amount
borrowed by an SHG ranges from Rs.20,000 to Rs.25,000.
Loans are given to members in accordance with the priorities
of the SHG at an interest rate of 2–3% per month. The rate of
interest is slightly lower for productive purposes than for conVolume 3 Number 2
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sumption. Use of the loan is decided by the member. It is
repaid in monthly installments over a year. Even though the
interest rate is much higher than that charged by banks, some
members prefer it to direct borrowing from banks because of
the ease of borrowing (i.e., simpler and quicker procedures).
No defaulters among the members were reported, confirming a
high degree of financial discipline. Equally, from the point of
view of the banks, based on the experience of bank managers
interviewed, the recovery rate is impressive (well over 90%). 8

Impact
Although detailed data on loan use and yields were not collected, the fact that there were virtually no defaulters suggests
that repayment at high rates of interest was not a problem for
poor borrowers. However, it is a moot point whether there are
more than a few activities—especially in the nonfarm sector—
which would yield returns in excess of 24–36%. In that case,
the range of viable investment options would be limited. Also,
as the loans are relatively small (compared with individual
loans under the MRCP), the options would be further
restricted. But the gains to the poor in terms of easier access to
credit and financial discipline must not be underestimated.
Moreover, as elaborated later, despite the control exercised by
male members in the choice and use of the assets, there is some
evidence—by no means conclusive—suggesting that the status
of women both within and outside the household has
improved. The benefits to the poor rural women—many of
whom might not have had access to formal credit channels—
through SHGs may thus be substantial. But whether the costs
are high too is not implausible. Although it takes six months
to form an SHG and 1–3 years for it to borrow from a bank,
much depends on the initiative of NGOs and banks. The
potential for reducing the costs may thus be substantial.
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Exclusion of the Poorest
Exclusion of the poorest from microcredit schemes is well
known. However, the reasons for their exclusion remain uninvestigated. Indeed, there is often a presumption that the moderately poor are less likely to default than the acutely poor. In
that case, targeting the moderately poor is likely to be more
sustainable financially. So exclusion of the poorest may well be
connected with a concern for financial sustainability. The present study explores the reasons for the exclusion of the poorest
in the sample villages.

Lack of Awareness
Few among the control group for individual beneficiaries—
mostly very poor households—knew anything about the
MRCP. There were two (out of the seven) who seemed vaguely
aware of this scheme through information disseminated by the
VDC and bank officers. The lack of awareness among two
tribal women (out of the three) in the control group for group
beneficiaries was equally glaring. Although more than a few
poor beneficiaries—especially individual borrowers—were also
not fully informed about some aspects of the MRCP (e.g.,
repayment obligations), they owed their participation either to
their own initiative or to their previous experience in the
IRDP. Among the group beneficiaries—mostly very poor—
however, much of the credit for their participation goes to the
initiative of Grameen Mahila Swayam Sevak Sangh and the
support and training provided by Chaitanya. It is not implausible that the neglect of SHGs in the control group was related
to their extreme poverty.
Social Exclusion
Although extreme poverty and social exclusion tend to go
together, some insights into the latter acting as a barrier to participation in the MRCP are obtained from the responses of a
few SC/ST households in the two control groups (i.e., one for
individual beneficiaries and another for SHGs). Despite conVolume 3 Number 2
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siderable initiative, one SC/ST respondent in Kanhewadi
lamented that he was not allowed to join an SHG. Another
SC/ST respondent in the same village narrated a similar experience, pointing to the uncooperative attitude of the village
community. A third tribal respondent in Kaman was apprehensive that his efforts to join an SHG might provoke a hostile
reaction from village and local authorities. In contrast, the two
tribal women belonging to the control group for group beneficiaries in Mohkal accepted their social exclusion passively.

Collusion
The inclusion of affluent households—with two owning 12 and
20 acres of land in Mohkal—reflects collusion among bank
staff, Sarpanch/Gram Sevak, and VDC. In each of the three
sample villages, most of the nonpoor households were nominated either by a Sarpanch or Gram Sevak and duly recommended by the VDC. The case of a vice chairman of the VDC
in Kaman nominating himself for a loan without any objection
from the VDC members or bank staff (who normally attend
VDC meetings) or Panchayat members is a glaring example of
collusion among them. The fact that all nonpoor beneficiaries
belonged to upper castes may not be a mere coincidence, as
their domination of local bodies is well known.
In contrast, SHGs represent the poor better in our sample,
largely because of their self-selection, induced by small loans
unrestricted in their use. This process of self-selection was
aided considerably by the initiative and support of Grameen
Mahila Swayam Sevak Sangh and Chaitanya.
But above all the identification procedure is unsatisfactory.
Even though it is well known that the list of poor households
is faulty—often 80–90% of the households in a village are classified as poor—that is the only basis for identifying the eligible
households. What is worse, the list is maintained by the Gram
Sevak, giving him undue importance in the selection process.
Instead of the BPL list being in the public domain—it is meant
to be displayed in the Village Panchayat office or some other
138
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prominent place—it is usually the Gram Sevak’s declaration
that counts.

Loan Appraisal and Follow up
The poorest—especially from SC/ST households—faced difficulties not just in the selection process but also in their bank transactions. The documentation was expensive and time consuming.
These difficulties were compounded by their illiteracy, their
lack of familiarity with the procedures, and the unhelpful attitude of the bank staff. As a result, the processing of loan
requests of the poor took much longer (1–6 months, as against
1–2 months in case of the nonpoor).
In general, bank staff gave hardly any loan related advice.
In fact, unless the applicant took the initiative, repayment
obligations were seldom fully disclosed. Nor was there any follow-up of loan use. As the poorest would have benefited more
from such advice and follow-up (e.g., in terms of productive
use of assets), its absence had serious implications for them.
Financial Stringency
Too much financial discipline or stringency—strict repayment
requirements, penalties for delays, etc.—could deter the poor
from joining a microcredit scheme or could limit duration of
their participation in it (Montgomery, 1996). These effects are
present in our sample but in a somewhat weak form. Among
individual beneficiaries, one SC/ST respondent reported that
he defaulted once and therefore had to pay two installments
together. Two other respondents drew attention to the seasonal variability of income from fishing constraining their
repayment ability. Apart from social exclusion, one nonparticipant SC/ST respondent (from the control group for individual beneficiaries) was skeptical of joining an SHG because of
his seasonal employment. A (tribal) widow, who belonged to
the control group for group beneficiaries, was equally diffident
about borrowing under the MRCP because of the irregularity
of her income. None of the participants, however, dropped out
of the scheme.
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These responses point to the need for flexibility in the
repayment of individual loans from banks (with monthly or
quarterly or annual installments over a period of 2–5 years) as
well as in loans given by SHGs (with monthly installments
over a period of 1 year), with a view to enhancing the participation of the poorest—many of whom are subject to uncertain
or (seasonally) fluctuating incomes.
Surprisingly, even though loans from SHGs were costlier
(2–3% per month as against 12% per annum from a bank),
some members—including the poorest—were emphatic that the
ease of obtaining loans and flexibility in their use more than
compensated for the higher cost. However, some poor individual beneficiaries would prefer membership in SHGs provided
the loan amounts are larger and interest rates lower.
To sum up, while some of the poorest failed to participate
in the MRCP either because of their lack of awareness or
inability to overcome their social exclusion, many more were
excluded because of arbitrariness in the selection of beneficiaries by VDCs and inadequate flexibility in the design of the
scheme (more specifically, in repayment requirements). To the
extent that the default rate is negligible and SHGs better represent the poor, further extension of the coverage of the
MRCP mainly through SHGs may well be sustainable provided of course the special needs of some backward sections
(e.g., tribal groups) stemming from their social exclusion and
irregularity of income are systematically addressed.

Community Involvement
In principle, VDAs/VDCs have an important role in identifying beneficiaries, arranging for loans, and following up on the
loans. Their formation, representativeness, and functioning are
thus crucial to the targeting of the MRCP. However, the picture that emerges from our survey of three villages in Pune
District is far from reassuring.
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Formation
The VDCs were constituted by the participating banks somewhat hastily and in an ad hoc manner to launch the MRCP.
Locally influential persons or groups, along with a few SC/ST
representatives, were inducted. A few Panchayat members—
including the Sarpanch—were also included. The relationship
between the VDAs and VDCs is somewhat vague. Although
bank officers and NGOs are supposed to participate in the
VDC meetings, their participation is usually a ritual.
Representativeness
Since there are no elections and the bank usually nominates
SC/ST and other members, the VDC is not a representative
body. Moreover, the nominated SC/ST members are unaware
of the objectives, procedures, and decisions. One woman
SC/ST member of the VDC (in Mohkal), for example, knew
nothing about the MRCP. She did, however, assert that the
VDC was dominated by influential persons.
Functioning
The VDC meets once a month. The agenda are not announced.
The venue is a Gram Panchayat (village council) office or a
temple. As there is no requirement for a quorum, the meeting
is held even if there are more than a few absentees. Selection of
MRCP beneficiaries is seldom discussed. Either the Sarpanch
(chairperson of the village council) or the Gram Sevak (the village level worker) nominates the beneficiaries. The list of poor
households (i.e., those below the poverty line) is in the custody
of the Gram Sevak. Although the lists are faulty (sometimes
80–90% of the households in a village are included), no questions are asked about their reliability. Even self-nomination of
influential persons (a vice-president of a VDC, for example,
nominated himself) is seldom challenged. If the poorest get
included in the list of potential beneficiaries, it is either
through the initiative of NGOs and Sahyoginis or through
their own efforts. Attention is also drawn to the nexus
between bank staff and VDC, resulting in substantially higher
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loans to relatively affluent persons. The minutes (including the
list of beneficiaries) are usually in the custody of the chairperson or the secretary of the VDC. That exclusion of the
poorest was to some extent deliberate cannot, therefore, be
ruled out.
To sum up, the functioning of the VDCs was neither participatory nor transparent. Given the weak accountability
mechanisms, arbitrary selection of beneficiaries remained
uncontested. An issue therefore is whether the replacement of
VDC and VDA by Gram Panchayat and Gram Sabha (village
assembly), respectively, would make a difference. Although
“capture” of Panchayats by a few influential persons is not
unusual, the fact that they are elected bodies with a statutory
basis renders them more representative of and accountable to
the village communities. As a result, exclusion of the poorest
may be reduced (Gaiha, 2000, Gaiha, Kaushik, & Kulkarni,
2000).

Loan Use Control and Related Issues
A few recent studies (e.g., Goetz and Sen Gupta, 1996; and
Rahman, 1998) have drawn attention to the difficulties of targeting credit on rural women. In particular, attention is drawn
to women being used as a conduit for obtaining credit with
hardly any role in the choice of assets and no control whatsoever on the incomes accruing from them. Yet the responsibility for the repayment of loans is often exclusively that of
women. In fact, failure to repay loans sometimes results in violence against them in poor households. The current survey
throws some light on these issues.

Asset Selection and Use
Out of the four women who responded in detail to questions
concerning asset selection and use, a widow—an individual
beneficiary—insisted that the asset (bullocks) was chosen by
her. But later on she admitted that the actual transaction was
done by her brother-in-law because he knew more about bul142

Volume 3 Number 2

final 3/2

9/11/02

11:46 AM

Page 143

Microcredit and the Rural Poor

locks. The remaining respondents pointed out that the decision was either that of the entire family or that of husband
and wife. Subsequently, however, it was revealed that a socalled joint decision of husband and wife was in fact dictated
by the husband. Thus, except for the widow, all other women
beneficiaries had a limited role in the selection of assets.
Except for one woman who bought goats, all other women
bought bullocks. As bullocks are used primarily by men (e.g.,
for plowing and transportation), it is unlikely that the women
had any control over the bullocks. But whether intrahousehold
distribution of power was reinforced in favour of male members seems unlikely, going by the responses of a few women
and other members of the village community.
None of the women beneficiaries complained that the
assets purchased interfered with their household chores. If
feeding of bullocks and goats is not exclusively a female
responsibility or not a strenuous activity, it may not add much
to a day’s work.

Income
In most cases—including a widow who bought goats and reared
them herself—the incomes accrued either to the family or
other relatives. The only exception was another widow who
bought bullocks and claimed that the income accrued to her
since the bullocks were registered in her name. Among the former, one respondent was emphatic that the income accruing
from the asset was considered family income. It could not be
ascertained whether this response was culturally conditioned
(i.e., whatever belongs to a woman also belongs to the family)
or simply tactful.
Repayment
Two respondents confirmed that, since the asset belonged to
the family, the repayment of the loan was also a joint responsibility. The widow who owned and managed the asset herself
(i.e., the owner of bullocks ) was of course responsible for the
repayment of the loan. The second widow (i.e., the owner of
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goats ), however, had no control over the income from the
asset but the repayment of the loan was her responsibility.

Status
Despite limited autonomy, two women respondents reported
emphatically an improvement in their status both within the
household and outside. As the assets are jointly registered in
the names of husband and wife, the women are seen as performing a productive role. Although the extra income earned
is modest, the “cost” to women in terms of extra hours worked
is negligible. No cases of violence against them were reported.
Indeed, initial male resistance waned as loans augmented
household incomes.
To sum up, while the benefits of enhancing the access of
poor women to credit are by no means insubstantial, they are
likely to be greater provided they have greater control over the
assets and incomes accruing from them.

Awareness, Skills, and Training
Awareness
In general, the awareness of the MRCP was limited to a few features (e.g., it provides loans to the poor) and a small group. In
the control group for individual beneficiaries, most of the
respondents were unaware of the MRCP. In contrast, while the
beneficiaries were better informed about this scheme, subsets of
them knew little about repayment obligations. Among the
members of SHGs with a good track record, all except one
woman were very well informed about the objectives of the
scheme, loan options, procedural requirements, and repayment
obligations. But, as in the case of the control group for individual beneficiaries, members of the control group for SHGs knew
virtually nothing about the MRCP. The fact that participants
and nonparticipants were distinguishable in terms of awareness
levels suggests that limited access to information about the
scheme acted as a barrier to participation. That the barrier was
harder to overcome for the poor is indicated by the fact that
144
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they relied mostly on the Gram Sevak or occasionally on an
enthusiastic field officer of a bank while others had multiple
sources of information (e.g., BDOs, Panchayats, bank officials,
representatives of official agencies, and mass media).
Overcoming this barrier was not enough for the poor, as
the procedures (e.g., documentation, and loan sanction) took
longer as well. While the nonpoor individual beneficiaries took
1 to 2 months to secure a loan, the poor took 1 to 6 months.
The longer delay reflected (1) greater difficulty of document
preparation, and (2) indifferent or unhelpful attitude of the
bank staff.

Skills
Most of the respondents were emphatic that they did not
require specialized training or skills for nonfarm activities. A
few activities (e.g., making pickles, making spices, sewing, and
selling vegetables) were mentioned that required traditional
skills which they possessed. However, their vision was conditioned by their illiteracy and limited exposure to markets. In
particular, there was little awareness of whether traditional
products (e.g., pickles or handicrafts) could be more efficiently
produced (e.g., as a group activity on a larger scale) or marketed better through existing channels (e.g., cooperatives) and
whether there were ways of avoiding business risks (e.g., withholding supplies when the price is likely to fall). The information and training imparted by MCED, MITCON, and
NGO/Sahyoginis is reviewed from this perspective.
Training
NGOs are sponsored by MAVIM or by the participating banks
to nurture SHGs in the initial stages. 9 Sahyoginis are the link
between NGOs and SHGs. They are trained by MAVIM (as
well as by NGOs). They perform a wide range of functions,
e.g., awareness building, attending group and block meetings,
maintaining records, training women in nonfarm activities, and
arranging trips to banks. Much of awareness building and training is imparted through group discussions and demonstrations,
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street plays, and cultural programs. In the sample of villages
studied, the duration of training given to SHG members was
1–3 days.
Even though the interaction and training of SHG members
was limited in duration, its favourable effects were noticeable.
These were reflected in greater self-confidence, awareness, and
willingness to undertake small businesses or trades among
them. Since SHGs in the sample villages correspond largely to
different caste and social groups (in other words, there is little
intermixing of different castes), the composition did not come
in the way. Nor did illiteracy pose any problems, given the format of training. However, it seems unlikely that SHGs can dispense with the guidance and support of Sahyoginis/NGOs. 10 In
particular, the special requirements of SC/ST households warrant greater attention and involvement. 11
Maharashtra Center for Entrepreneurship Development (MCED)

MCED has a different focus. It trains entrepreneurs and assists
them through market surveys, documentation and management counseling. Usually, the training is given in groups of 3060 persons. It is residential and lasts 12-13 days. Among the
successes claimed, a notable case was gunny bag manufacturing
by women. This had a strong demonstrative effect. However,
its focus on the poor with some business experience reflected
the inability of its staff to design suitable training modules for
the very poor.
Maharashtra Industrial and Technical Consultancy Organization
(MITCON)

MITCON’s major function is to provide quality consultancy
for small and medium enterprises at affordable fees.
Specifically, project reports in Marathi, prepared by its staff,
are supplied to potential entrepreneurs. After a project is
selected, MITCON monitors its progress. Shortage of field
staff—especially females—is a constraint.
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Assessment
Some deficiencies came to light. The Sahyoginis were overburdened, as they covered a large number of SHGs—one of the
two Sahyoginis interviewed, for example, is involved with 21
SHGs. Moreover, considering the nature of the work (e.g., frequent travel), the remuneration (Rs.1500 per month) is inadequate. Finally, as remuneration is not linked to performance,
there is no incentive for them to induce the poorest to participate in the scheme. On the other hand, MCED and MITCON
do not appear to be suitable for the rural poor, as their focus is
largely on small and medium enterprises. Residential entrepreneurial development programs offered by MCED and supply
of project reports by MITCON may be not just too exacting
but also inappropriate for large sections of the rural poor—
especially women—lacking literacy, numeracy, and exposure to
markets. The training provided by NGOs and Sahyoginis, on
the other hand, seems far more useful because of its emphasis
on problem-solving skills in a village environment. An option,
therefore, is to strengthen this component of training, by
broadening the range of expertise of Sahyoginis, through their
closer interaction with the poorest, and more remunerative
salaries linked to performance.

Other Issues
Some issues that require further analysis are briefly discussed
below.
1. Although some acutely poor women did not mind paying
high interest rates (2–3% per month) as members of SHGs,
and a few insisted that the ease of borrowing compensated
for the difference between the interest paid and that charged
by the banks (12% per annum), it is not clear whether the
urgency of consumption and other needs (e.g., festivities or
sickness) mattered too (since banks do not normally lend for
such purposes). There is thus a need to examine carefully
whether a more than moderate lowering of the interest rates
is feasible.
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2. A few responses pointed to difficulties in the repayment of
loans due to seasonal fluctuations in yields (e.g., fishing) and
contingencies (e.g., sickness). It is therefore necessary to supplement the present analysis through an investigation of
types of assets financed by the MRCP, their retention rates,
and yields.
3. The size of SHGs and their regulation are linked. If an SHG
has more than 20 members, it will attract the provisions of
Section 11 (2) of the Companies Act, 1956. 12 As a result,
SHGs usually consist of 15–20 members. Whether this is an
optimal group size is not self-evident. Indeed, given the
emphasis on savings mobilization, slightly larger groups may
be more appropriate and not necessarily less cohesive. But,
since they handle large amounts of public funds, there is a
case for regulation.
4. A concern is whether group cohesiveness is synonymous
with homogeneity of social background (e.g., caste affiliation) and/or economic status. In our sample, for example,
there was little intermingling of different castes. But in a
larger sample there were a few mixed groups that functioned
well (Shankar, 2000). This suggests that under certain conditions group heterogeneity is not a barrier to group cohesiveness. An issue, therefore, is whether the village environment
(i.e., whether there is a great deal of intermingling of different castes in village events, e.g., a major festival) has a role in
cohesiveness. Some insights into how various forms of differentiation are overcome or why they do not matter in a
certain context would be valuable for expanding the social
capital (i.e., trust, reciprocity, and networks of mutually
beneficial relationships) through SHGs. Appropriate policy
instruments could then be devised.

Concluding Observations
A selective summary of the findings is given below.
1. When key correlates of poverty are applied, the nonpoor
beneficiaries of individual loans under this scheme turned
148
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out to be more than the poor. What was more surprising was
the presence of a few quite affluent persons among them.
However, SHGs with a good track record consisted mostly
of poor women.
2. Exclusion of the poorest (e.g., tribals) was partly a result of
their own lack of awareness about the MRCP and diffidence
about their ability to repay loans. But more seriously their
exclusion also reflected their social isolation, the resistance
of upper castes, and the nexus among the bank staff,
Sarpanch, and VDC.
3. Among the individual borrowers, not just the selection but
also the benefits varied somewhat depending on whether the
borrower belonged to a poor or affluent household. The loan
processing time was much longer for the poor. Moreover,
the affluent secured much larger loans.
4. The financial discipline demonstrated by the SHGs was
impressive. This was reflected in high rates of recovery of
loans both by the banks and by the groups themselves.
5. While no case of violence was reported, there were indications of male dominance in the selection and the use of the
assets.
6. Combining financial services with some forms of insurance
(e.g., against illness and accidents) would make the MRCP
more attractive to the rural poor, as their ability to deal with
contingencies is limited. Willingness to pay for additional
services is not lacking among them provided the benefits are
carefully explained to them.
To sum up, the effectiveness of a microcredit scheme such
as the MRCP is likely to depend on whether it has the flexibility to induce the participation of the poorest and whether it
enables them to acquire the basic skills to benefit from it.
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Abbreviations and Acronyms
BDO
BOM
BPL
CB
DCCB
DPCC
DRDA
EDP
FO
GOI
GOM
IFAD
IRDP
MAVIM
MCED
MITCON
MRCP
NABARD
NGO
PAP
RBI
RRB
SBI
SC/ST
SHG
SYG
SGSY
VDA
VDC

150

Block Development Officer
Bank of Maharashtra
Below Poverty Line
Commercial Bank
District Cooperative Credit Bank
District Project Coordination Committee
District Rural Development Agency
Entrepreneurial Development Program
Field Officer
Government of India
Government of Maharashtra
International Fund for Agricultural
Development
Integrated Rural Development Program
Mahila Arthik Vikas Mahamandal
Maharashtra Center for Entrepreneurship
Development
Maharashtra Industrial and Technical
Consultancy Organization
Maharashtra Rural Credit Project
National Bank for Agriculture and Rural
Development
Non-Government Organization
Peoples’ Action Plan
Reserve Bank of India
Regional Rural Bank
State Bank of India
Scheduled Caste/Scheduled Tribe
Self-Help Group
Sahyogini
Swarnjayanti Gram Swarozgar Yojana
Village Development Assembly
Village Development Council
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Glossary
Gram Sabha
Gram Panchayat
Gram Sevak
Sarpanch
Sahyoginis

Village Assembly
Village Council (an elected body)
Village Level Worker
Chairperson of Village Council
Field Workers

Notes
Thanks are due to P. Roy for suggesting this study and for sharing his concerns; to S. Khadka for his support and guidance at all stages; to P. Bardhan, P.
Eklund, O. Feinstein, S. Howes, B. Randhawa, S. Kothari, V. Kulkarni, S.
Mathur, R. Jha, C. Palmeri, P. Scandizzo, H. D. Seibel, S. Shankar, T. N.
Srinivasan and G. Thapa for useful discussions; to Mani Arul Nandhi for her
meticulous help with the interpretaion of the survey data; to B. N. Kamble and
S. Madheswaran for their able supervision of the field-work; and, finally, to the
Managing Editor and a reviewer for their constructive suggestions. Any deficiencies that remain are the author’s responsibility.
1. The Integrated Rural Development Program (IRDP), operating since
1978–79, is a major credit program designed for the rural poor. However, several
reviews point to its mistargeting, corruption, preponderance of animal husbandry schemes, absence of linkages, lack of adequate follow-up, and consequent
high overdues of banks (Dreze, 1990; Gaiha et el., 1998; Gaiha et al., 2000; Gaiha
et al., 2001).
2. The official exchange rate in 1991–92 was Rs. 17.95 to the dollar. At the
time of the fieldwork in 1999–2000, it was approximately Rs. 44 to the dollar.
3. As it takes 1–3 years after a group is formed to borrow from a bank, it is
not surprising that out of a total of 2006, barely 815 SHGs were linked to the
banks (UNOPS, 1998).
4. Income in the hands of women has different effects on household decision
making than income accruing to men. For instance, wage employment is generally observed to result in improved women’s bargaining position within the
household and in higher energy intakes for children. For a review of the evidence, see Deolalikar and Gaiha (1996).
5. The classification of households into poor and nonpoor takes into account
these characteristics as well as whether household income was ≤ Rs. 12,000 per
annum (for a household of five) at current prices, among others.
6. Going by IFAD (1997), a share of non-BPL households exceeding 20% is
considered excessive.
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7. Note that the group of SHGs not functioning satisfactorily (abbreviated
as NFS) is classified as the control group. The observations that follow are therefore confined to SHGs functioning satisfactorily (abbreviated as FS).
8. What is interesting to note is that repayment rates for individual borrowers were nearly as high. The reasons include VDC monitoring of loans, loss of
reputation of defaulters, and the realization that the loans had to be repaid.
9. Each NGO is assigned six villages under the MRCP.
10. One Sahyogini (operating in Mohkal) pointed out that attempts to reduce
her contact with SHGs caused confusion among the members. This is plausible,
as it was corroborated by two representatives of financial institutions as well.
11. Alcoholism among men and women, attachment to traditional practices,
and low acceptance of strangers makes establishing connections with tribals
more challenging. (I owe this observation to Shylashri Shankar).
12. No company or association or partnership consisting of more than 20
persons shall be formed for carrying on business that has for its object the acquisition of gain by the company or by the individual members thereof, unless it is
registered under the Act.
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